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NOTE
And Baby Makes Two: Posthumously
Conceived Children and
the Eighth Circuit's Denial of Survivors
Benefits




Amidst the ever-evolving definition of family, situations are becoming
increasingly common in which the arrival of a newborn no longer solidifies a
family of three (mom, dad, and baby) as expected. Rather, this baby, a suc-
cessful result of assisted reproduction, makes two. Widows and single fe-
males alike are now able to become pregnant on their own, even after the
death of the genetic father, as long as his sperm has been preserved and is
available. Yet, such a revolutionary concept, referred to as posthumous con-
ception, is not without controversy.
The Eighth Circuit case of Beeler v. Astrue is one in a line of cases that
addresses the issue of whether posthumously conceived children may receive
their deceased fathers' Social Security benefits. Unlike their traditionally
conceived peers, posthumously conceived children face multiple obstacles to
qualify for such financial award.
In light of the recent Supreme Court of the United States case of Astrue
v. Capato,I which involved a similar issue, this Note will address the lack of
uniformity and guidance among the respective appellate courts regarding the
issue. Specifically, the emerging circuit split concerning posthumously con-
ceived children and their rights to Social Security benefits based on the earn-
ing records of their deceased, genetic fathers will be examined. In order to do
so, the facts and holding of Beeler are first discussed, followed by an expla-
nation of Assisted Reproductive Technology. Next, the Social Security Act,
along with relevant provisions and case law, will be explored. Lastly, this
Note will analyze Beeler and its ramifications in Missouri, as well as its im-
B.A., University of California, Los Angeles 2009; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law 2013; Associate Managing Editor 2012-2013, Missouri Law
Review. I am grateful for the advice and guidance of Professor David M. English.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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pact upon public policy. This Note ultimately concludes that the creation of a
uniform federal standard, or at the very least state-specific statutes, for the
children at issue is long overdue.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Following a five-month whirlwind romance, Bruce and Patti Beeler
were engaged by February 2000 and planning for a spring wedding the next
year. Unfortunately, Bruce was diagnosed with acute leukemia, and because
the couple's eventual desire to have children was threatened by the potential
that chemotherapy treatments would render him sterile, Bruce banked his
semen at an Iowa fertility clinic.3
Upon receiving grim news regarding Bruce's chances of survival, the
couple married earlier than anticipated in December 2000.4 Two months
later, Bruce bequeathed his semen to Patti, only to be used by her "in the
event of his death," and signed a hospital form acknowledging "paternity and
child support responsibility" for any future children. Following an unsuc-
cessful bone marrow transplant, Bruce passed away in May 2001, comforted
by the belief that "Patti would have his children after he died."6
Patti later underwent artificial insemination,7 and her posthumously
conceived daughter B.E.B. was born in April 2003, with Bruce listed undis-
putedly as the biological father on the child's birth certificate.8 Two months
later, Patti filed an application for B.E.B.'s child survivor insurance benefits
under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), the relevant provision of the Social Security Act
(Act).9 This provision, which outlines the requirements for securing survi-
vors insurance benefits, includes a specific segment regarding children of a
deceased parent and their eligibility for such award.'o One requirement is
that a minor applicant fit within the definition of a "child" per section 416(e)
of the same title.1




5. Id. at 956-57.
6. Id. at 957.
7. Artificial insemination, known more specifically as intrauterine insemination
(IUI), is a fertility treatment in which sperm are surgically introduced to the woman's
body. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/index.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2012).
8. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957.
9. Id.; see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d) (2006).
10. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
11. See infra note 53 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).
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The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied both B.E.B.'s applica-
tion and Patti's subsequent request for reconsideration on behalf of her
daughter.12 At a March 2008 hearing before an administrative law judge, the
case was directed to the SSA's Appeals Council with a recommendation that
B.E.B. not receive benefits.13 The council made its final decision on Decem-
ber 22, 2008, ruling that B.E.B. was "not the child of the wage earner within
the meaning of the Social Security Act" and thus not qualified for any finan-
cial awards. 14
Believing her daughter was in fact entitled to benefits, Patti sued the
SSA in an Iowa federal district court for further review of the denial.' 5 The
district court reversed the agency's ruling and ordered B.E.B.'s benefits to be
distributed. Upon the district court's refusal to address its motion to amend
the judgment, the SSA filed a timely notice of appeal with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'7
In reviewing the appeal, the Eighth Circuit examined 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(e), which defines the term "child" as required under section
402(d)(1)." The relevant portion of section 416(e) broadly states, "the term
'child' means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual," (2) a
stepchild of the insured person for at least nine months before the insured
person died, or (3) a grandchild or stepgrandchild of the insured person in
specific situations.19 Both the courts and the SSA have, however, interpreted
"child" as referring exclusively to the natural,, or genetic, offspring of the
insured.20 Section 416(h) provides further guidance for interpreting subsec-
tion (e), declaring that a child applicant is a natural child and thus entitled to
survivor benefits if he or she would be privileged to take under "such [state]
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property." 21
Relying upon subsection (h) to construe subsection (e), the Eighth Cir-
cuit looked to Iowa intestacy law and decided that B.E.B. would be unable to
inherit from Bruce Beeler because she was not "begotten," or created before
his death, as required by state intestacy law. 22 Therefore, the instant court
12. Beeler, 651. F.3d at 957.
13. Id.




18. Id at 958; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).
20. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 958; Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th
Cir. 2004) (listing cases which have defined "child" as a natural child), abrogated by
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
21. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 958 (emphasis omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h).
22. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965; see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
2012] 831
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found that the original, authoritative interpretation by the SSA Appeals
Council should be upheld.23
In spite of Patti Beeler's contentions that B.E.B.'s "child" status could
otherwise be satisfied, the court held that 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) was the "exclu-
sive means" by which B.E.B., or any other posthumously conceived child
within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit, could establish natural child
status as required by subsection (e).24 Therefore, the judgment of the Iowa
federal district court was reversed and remanded in favor of the SSA. 25 The
Eighth Circuit, ultimately siding with the SSA, held that B.E.B. was not an
eligible "child" as defined for survivors benefits.26
Although the Eighth Circuit recognized the "profoundly sad" situation
of the Beeler family, they emphasized upholding the SSA's goal of "primarily
helping those children who lost support after the unanticipated death of a
parent."27 Adhering to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), when a posthumously con-
ceived child applies for Social Security survivors benefits in the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the matter of the child's eligibility must automatically defer to the re-
spective state intestacy laws.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to set the framework for analyzing the Eighth Circuit's decision
in the instant decision, this section will first provide an overview of assisted
reproduction. Next, the relevant portion of the Social Security Act will be
examined, followed by the principal uniform laws, codes, and Restatement on
point. For further examination of how the Act has been interpreted, recent
case law from across the circuits concerning posthumously conceived chil-
dren and SSA benefits will be presented. Lastly, Missouri intestate statutes
will be introduced for later application.
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology
In situations where procreation by sexual intercourse has failed or is not
an option, assisted reproduction provides an opportunity for sterile couples,
23. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962, 966. The Eighth Circuit gave Chevron deference to
the SSA Appeals Council. Id at 962. Under Chevron, a court is prohibited from
"[substituting] its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpre-
tation made by the administrator of an agency" if Congress had "explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
24. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
25. Id. at 966.
26. Id. at 958, 966.
27. Id. at 966 (quoting Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
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same-sex partnerships, single parents, and widows alike to become pregnant.
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), or "[a]ny technology that is em-
ployed to conceive a child by means other than sexual intercourse," 29 helps a
woman become pregnant by "surgically removing [her] eggs[,] . . . combining
them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman's body
or donating them to another woman." 30 This process, available in the United
States since 1981, has doubled in use over the past decade.31 Currently, over
one percent of all infants born annually in the United States are conceived via
ART, most commonly through in vitro fertilization.32
A form of assisted reproduction specific to the instant decision is cryo-
preservation, the "process by which gametes or embryos are treated and then
frozen for potential future use," such as conception following the death of the
male "gamete [provider]." 33 This harvesting of sperm for potential posthu-
mous conception by a female partner is common among soldiers, men with
terminal illnesses, and athletes involved in dangerous activities. 34 Postmor-
tem gathering of a female's eggs is also possible, although the process is in-
creasingly more difficult and often "weighs against retrieval." 35 Nor is "egg-
freezing technology as advanced" as that available for male genetic mate-
36
rial. Generally though, the abundance of such cryopreserved gametes and
embryos after death provides "ample resources for the posthumous concep-
tion of children."37 However, this postmortem process has been made illegal
in Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden.38
29. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE
402 (2d ed. 2011).
30. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), supra note 7.
3 1. Id.
32. Id. In vitro fertilization, or IVF, is a more invasive ART surgical procedure
in comparison to intrauterine insemination (RU). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 reporter's n.8 (1999); see supra note 7. IUI
places stronger emphasis on the "use and consent associated with sperm," while IVF
focuses more on the sperm's fertilization of the egg. Andrea Messmer, Note, Assisted
Reproductive Technology: A Lawyer's Guide to Emerging Law and Science, 3 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 203, 211 (2007).
33. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 403-04.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id. at 257-58. For this procedure, a comatose female must be kept alive so
that "ovulation can be induced prior to retrieval," which may take several weeks. Id.
at 257.
36. Id. at 258.
37. Id. at 552.
38. Id. at 265. In illegalizing cryopreservation, Canada, for example, has exam-
ined the "quagmire of legal, social and ethical issues" of the process. Frozen Human
Egg Buyers May Face Prosecution, CBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2012/04/23/eggs-frozen-trade.html. Health
Canada, the country's federal health department, has said that although cryopreserva-
8332012]
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ART is by no means a perfect solution to infertility. Medical risks in-
clude the increased necessity of Caesarean sections, premature deliveries,
newborns with low-birth weights, and multiple births.39  Women are often
confined to bed rest or prolonged hospital stays to lower the risk of an early
delivery, from which a premature infant could have "significant medical
needs" or "lifelong handicaps." 40 ART also demands a hefty financial com-
mitment; only select jurisdictions require medical insurance plans to cover "at
41least some" of these particular procedures. Assisted reproduction proce-
dures may require multiple, sometimes unsuccessful cycles, so strong emo-
42tional tolerance is essential. Additionally, great potential for legal harm
exists in applying these reproductive methods. Not only is the scope of litiga-
tion "enormous" if the resulting child is deformed, but there are numerous
possibilities of "negligence, false advertising, [and] failure to warn of dan-
gers."43
In spite of the constitutional protection of procreation, the law has been
hesitant to equate assisted reproduction with traditional notions of concep-
tion.4 Such reluctance can perhaps be attributed to complications arising
from the potential of an ART child having as many as eight parents, 45 or the
tion "requires confirmation of consent from the donor" and a document exchange,
"there's no watchdog that's really out there and there are no solid rules [to] ... rely
on." Id (internal quotations omitted); About Health Canada, HEALTH CANADA,
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/index-eng.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
A possible future, but controversial method of ART is human cloning.
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 283. Human cloning requires human
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), which is the creation of embryos without fertili-
zation. Id. at 283. If implanted in a uterus to initiate a pregnancy, these embryos
could "develop into a human with the same genetic makeup as the person from whose
cell the nucleus was extracted." Id. Although described as a "real potential ... re-
productive option," multiple states have proactively banned such reproductive cloning
in spite of any actual, successful results. Id. at 281-82. This "preemptive banning is
the first of its kind" in comparison to the relatively uncontroversial evolution of all
other ART methods "without hindrance" from state governments. Id. at 282. Regard-
less, it has been speculated that despite its "significant psychological, emotional [and]
moral risk[s]," human cloning will eventually be a legally protected, "reproductive
choice . . . under the [constitutional] right of privacy," similar to all other ART op-
tions. Id. at 297.
39. Messmer, supra note 32, at 206.
40. Id. at 207.
41. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 29.
42. Messmer, supra note 32, at 207.
43. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 302.
44. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598 (2002).
45. See id. at 602. Potential parents for a child of assisted reproduction may
include "the egg donor, the sperm donor, their spouses, the surrogate and her husband,
and the intending mother and father." Id.
[Vol. 77834
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reluctance may stem from the controversy of sex selection, in which a woman
is essentially able to choose the gender of her baby." The complete lack of
any nationally recognized uniform law focused on ART also reflects the re-
luctance of state legislatures to "enact controlling statutes" to regulate this
emerging sphere of non-traditional conception, in spite of assisted reproduc-
tion's decades of success. 47
B. The Social Security Act and Related Provisions
Following the stock market crash and the Great Depression, President
48Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act into law on August 14, 1935.
Designed to provide for the general welfare of the country, one of the Act's
main provisions created a "social insurance program," which paid retirement
benefits to only "the primary worker [of the household] when he or she re-
tired at age 65," based upon that individual's tax contributions.49
The 1939 Amendments expanded the Act to include survivors benefits,
which are distributed to "the family in the event of the premature death of a
covered worker."50 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), subchapter II of the Act
specifically addresses the criteria a child must meet in order to be eligible for
survivors insurance benefits.5' The minor applicant must:
(1) [Be] a "child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title),"
(2) of a fully insured individual,
(3) who has filed an application for child's insurance benefits,
(4) is unmarried and under 18 years old, and
46. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Synthetic Cells, Synthetic Life, and Inheritance, 45
VAL. U. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2011). Sex selection of a potential baby involves the
sorting of male-producing sperm from female-producing sperm and then inseminating
the woman with the "sorted sperm of the desired gender." Id. at 1365. In spite of the
ongoing disputes, however, this procedure "now rakes in revenues of at least $100
million every year." Jasmeet Sidhu, How to Buy a Daughter, SLATE (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/medical-examiner/2012/09/sexsel
ec-
tion in babiesthroughpgdamericansare_payingto have daughters rather than
sons .single.html#pagebreak anchor_3. An "estimated 4,000 to 6,000" sex selec-
tion procedures are being performed each year, with reputable fertility clinics charg-
ing about $18,000 per surgery. Id.
47. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 29, at xv-xvi.
48. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
49. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, Soc. SECURITY
ADMIN. (May 16, 2012), http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html.
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006).
2012] 835
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(5) was dependent upon the fully insured individual at the time of
the insured individual's death.52
Referring to the first requirement, section 416(e) sets out three classes of
individuals who are considered a "child."53 The applicable class of "child" to
the instant decision defines the term as "the child . . . of an individual." 54
Along with the SSA, courts have understood this definition to refer exclu-
sively to the "natural," or genetic, child of the insured.55 As such, the SSA
has adopted the narrow stance that posthumously conceived children can
qualify as natural children only if they may inherit through their respective
state intestacy codes.
The Act has been construed "liberally" in favor of surviving children to
ensure their financial stability after a parent's death. 57 Thus, its purpose has
shifted from a workers' retirement pro ram to one centered upon the provi-
sion of economic security for families. Various state law-related provisions
concerning inheritance rights have been proposed to deal with the conver-
gence of posthumously conceived children and survivors benefits. 59
First, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA) states that if an individual whose egg or sperm is harvested
passes away before a child has been conceived by means other than sexual
intercourse, then that individual is "not a parent of the resulting child." 60 This
1988 Act completely "eliminates the ability of all posthumously conceived
children to be the legal child of a deceased parent" and thus denies any inheri-
tance via intestate succession. 61 Although this Act is still technically in exis-
52. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2679 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).
54. Id.; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 958.
55. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2004). It should be
noted that there are various codified definitions for a "child," but for the purposes of
subchapter II of the Social Security Act, only section 416(e) applies. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 416(e), with 42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(A) (defining "child" differently than in the
instant case for purposes of foster care and adoption services).
56. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656-01 (Sept. 22, 2005).
57. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598; see also Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093,
1095 (9th Cir. 1987); Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. Historical Background and Development ofSocial Security, supra note 49.
59. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
60. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b), 9C U.L.A
24 (2001).
61. Joseph H. Karlin, "Daddy, Can You Spare a Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights
of Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1317, 1331 (2006).
836 [Vol. 77
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tence,62 it has essentially been overruled by the enactment of more modem,
flexible proposals as described below.
Second, the original version of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.)
section 2-108 supported the traditional proposition that only a child conceived
prior to, but born after the decedent's death, could be an heir. However, the
updated U.P.C. section 2-120 now allows a deceased parent-posthumously
conceived child relationship to be established by "proof that the [now-
deceased] individual consented to assisted reproduction by the birth mother
with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child." Consent is most
easily demonstrated if an individual "signed a record" agreeing to the above
provision; in the absence of physical documentation, consent may also be
established if "clear and convincing evidence" proves that the individual in-
tended to be treated as the "other" parent, but "death, incapacity, or other
circumstances prevented the individual from carrying out that intent."
Furthermore, these 2008 U.P.C. amendments provide that if the de-
ceased spouse was married to the birth mother, no divorce proceeding was
pending, and no evidence indicated to the contrary, then the deceased indi-
vidual is presumed to have consented to assisted reproduction and any result-
ing parentage. Another revision implements a time frame for when a post-
humous child must be born in order to be able to inherit - the child must ei-
ther be "in utero not later than 36 months after the individual's death" or
"born not later than 45 months after the individual's death."67  Subject to
these conditions, as long as the decedent has shown some sort of consent, the
U.P.C. is apt to treat a posthumously conceived child as if he or she had been
born within the decedent's lifetime.
With regards to class gifts that provide for a "trust beneficiary's chil-
dren," U.P.C. section 2-705 states that "a term of relationship to identify the
class members includes a child of assisted reproduction . .. and their respec-
62. The USCACA has only been adopted in two states - North Dakota and Vir-
ginia. F. Barrett Faulkner, Applying Old Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests
of Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 33
n.3 (2003).
63. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 283 (1998).
64. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008), cmt. subsec. (f), 8 U.L.A. 60
(Supp. 2011) (emphasis added). Although it may seem somewhat foolproof, courts
have occasionally interpreted the requirement as consenting to a specific, in utero
child - meaning the deceased parent must have known and acknowledged the fact that
his spouse was already pregnant prior to his death. See infra notes 148-49.
65. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008), cmt. subsec. (f), 8 U.L.A. 59
(Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at cmt. subsec. (h).
67. Id. at cmt. subsec. (k).
68. Kimberly E. Naguit, Note, The Inadequacies of Missouri Intestacy Law:
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tive descendants if appropriate to the class, in accordance with the rules for
intestate succession regarding parent-child relationships." 69 However, this is
merely a rule of construction, subject to a contrary intent in the governing
instrument.70
Third, according to the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, as long as a de-
ceased individual consented on the record that if ART were to occur postmor-
tem, he would be a parent of the child, the posthumously conceived child will
have recognized inheritance rights. ' Similar to the U.P.C. amendments, the
Uniform Parentage Act deters nonconsensual, postmortem use of another's
gametes or embryos and is "even more favorable" than the USCACA toward
72rights for children of assisted reproduction.
Last, section 2.5(1) of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and
Donative Transfers is the most flexible and explains that for the purposes of
intestate succession, "[a]n individual is the child of his or her genetic parents,
whether or not they are married to each other."73 Additionally, in order to
inherit, a child of assisted reproduction "must be bom within a reasonable
time after the decedent's death," assuming the deceased parent would have
approved. 74 Unlike the U.P.C. amendments, this Restatement has no definite
time parameters for when the posthumously conceived child must be born.
Based on the various proposals above and the burgeoning popularity of As-
sisted Reproductive Technology, legal reform will likely continue to emerge
and adapt, attempting to keep pace with and reflect the decisions of the states.
C. Recent Case Law Interpreting the Social Security Act
Due to ART advancements in the last decade, courts have seen a rapid
increase in the number of cases concerning the inheritance rights of posthu-
mously conceived children. Specifically, a federal circuit split is developing
among those appellate courts that have addressed whether such children can
qualify for survivors benefits.
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security was one of the earliest
cases to address this issue.75 Warren Woodward had banked his semen prior
69. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 141 (Supp. 2011).
70. Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the Class-
Gift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35
ACTEC J. 30, 31 (2009).
71. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2011).
72. Karlin, supra note 61, at 1333.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(1)
(1999).
74. Id. at illus. 8(1).
75. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). Although not a circuit court case, this 2002
opinion was the result of a question of law certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts by the U.S. District Court of the District of Massachusetts for a federal
advisory opinion. Id at 259.
838 [ Vol. 77
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to undergoing treatment for leukemia; after his death, his wife Lauren con-
ceived via artificial insemination with Warren's stored genetic material and
gave birth to twin girls.76
Following the denial of her daughters' child survivors benefits under 42
U.S.C. § 402(d) by both the SSA and an administrative law judge, the Ap-
peals Council of the SSA affirmed. 77 They reasoned that the twins were not
Warren's children "within the meaning of the Act" since they were "not enti-
tled to inherit from [Warren] under the Massachusetts intestacy and paternity
laws."78 Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, which certified the inheritance question to the state's Su-
preme Judicial Court.79 However, the district court judge did not order a de-
termination of the facts specific to this case; thus, the Woodward twins' bene-
fits were not decided.so
In determining the inheritance rights for posthumously conceived chil-
dren under Massachusetts intestacy law, the court found that "limited circum-
stances" exist in which posthumously conceived children may inherit. First,
a wife must establish the children's genetic relationship with the decedent,
and second, the decedent must have consented "both to reproduce posthu-
mously and to support any resulting child."82 In reaching its conclusion, the
Supreme Judicial Court first examined the posthumous children section of the
state's intestacy law, which failed to provide for after-born heirs.
However, the Massachusetts court recognized the many decades of
ART's success and decided to not "impute to the Legislature the inherently
irrational conclusion that assistive reproductive technologies are to be en-
couraged while a class of children who are the fruit of that technology are to
have fewer rights . . . than other children."84 Thus, the state Supreme Judicial
Court disagreed with the SSA's deference to the "historical context" of the
state's posthumous children provision and recognized that ART had outpaced
the state's intestacy statutes. In doing so, they paved the way for posthu-
76. Id. at 260.
77. Id. at 261.
78. Id. at 260-61.
79. Id. at 261.
80. The district court judge did not ask the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts to "determine whether the circumstances giving rise to succession rights for
posthumously conceived children apply here." Id. at 259-60.
81. Id. at 272.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 264. Massachusetts law states, "Inheritance or succession by right of
representation is the taking by the descendants of a deceased heir of the same share or
right in the estate of another person as their parent would have taken if living. Post-
humous children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190 § 8 (repealed 2008).
84. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265.
85. Id. at 265-66.
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mously conceived minors to potentially inherit and be eligible for benefits. In
sum, the Supreme Judicial Court stated:
Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world the
way the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless.
We may assume that the Legislature intended that such children be
entitled, in so far as possible, to the same rights and protections of
the law as children conceived before death.
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered this issue for the first time in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart.8 7 On appeal
from an Arizona district court, the circuit court ruled that Juliet and Piers
Netting, the posthumously conceived twins of married parents Rhonda and
the late Robert Netting, were in fact entitled to child survivors insurance
88 89benefits. Having lost their father to cancer before they were born, the
twins were ultimately found to be Robert's natural, dependent children under
Arizona law, thus satisfying the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 402.90
In examining the "child" element of section 402, the Ninth Circuit
looked to 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) and decided Juliet and Piers qualified as "natu-
ral" children, simply because of their parents' valid marriage and their undis-
puted biological relationship to Robert.9 1 The court held that subsection (h),
which refers to state intestacy law, was irrelevant; only if the children's par-
entage were disputed (i.e., the children were born out of wedlock) should this
provision be examined.92 Additionally, an Arizona statute provided that
"every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents" and that natural
parents have a "legal obligation" to support their offspring.93 Thus, as the
Ninth Circuit reasoned, because the twins were Robert's natural, legitimate
children, they were also automatically dependent upon him and therefore
entitled to insurance benefits based on his earnings. 94 This decision standard-
ized the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Act: a posthumously conceived
child need only meet the standards of "natural" child status and dependency
under state law to be awarded survivors benefits. 95
86. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
88. Id. at 599.
89. See id. at 594-95.
90. Id. at 599.
91. Id. at 596-97.
92. Id. at 597.
93. Id. at 598-99; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-601, 25-501 (West, West-
law through Second Regular Session of the Fiftieth Legislature).
94. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
95. Id. at 598-99. Subsequently in September 2005, the SSA issued an Acquies-
cence Ruling to the Gillett-Netting decision. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105
(9th Cir. 2009). Such a ruling typically "explains how [the SSA] will apply a holding
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However, not all states within the Ninth Circuit have similar "reliance"
laws. In Vernoffv. Astrue, California followed and applied the Acquiescence
Ruling" from Gillett-Netting but with opposite results.97 Following Bruce
Vernoff's accidental death, posthumously conceived Brandalynn was denied
child survivors benefits under the Act. Although Brandalynn was deter-
mined to be the natural, biological child of her dad,9 she failed to establish
her dependence upon Bruce at the time of his death, which was required by
California law." 0 Because Brandalynn's parentage was disputed, California
law deemed her an illegitimate child, therefore invoking the state intestacy
law per subsection 416(h).' 0
Unlike Arizona, California requires more than a "mere biological rela-
tionship ... to grant status as a natural parent"; rather, reliance is placed upon
the "existence" of a parent-child relationship.102 Specifically, California
Family Code validates such natural parent status for a father if his child is
born during the marriage or "within 300 days after the marriage is terminated
by [his] death."10 3 Because Brandalynn was not born within 300 days of
Bruce's death, she could not claim Bruce as her natural father nor any de-
pendence upon him.1
Additionally, the court interpreted California Probate Code as only pro-
viding for children who were "conceived before the decedent's death but born
thereafter." 05  Brandalynn was conceived via in vitro fertilization nearly
three years after her father's death." 6 Although the Ninth Circuit applied the
same pattern of analysis as in Gillett-Netting, because Brandalynn could not
establish dependence under California law, she failed the intestacy test and
was denied survivors benefits.' 07
The issue of rights for posthumously conceived children reached the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2011 and resulted in
in a decision of a United States Court of Appeals that . . . conflicts with [their] inter-
pretation of a provision of the Social Security Act." SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg.
55,656-01 (Sept. 22, 2005).
96. The Acquiescence Ruling limited the application of Gillett-Netting to claims
within the Ninth Circuit. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656-01 (Sept. 22, 2005).
97. 568 F.3d at 1105, 1111-12.
98. Id. at 1105.
99. Id. at 1109.
100. Id at 1104.
101. Id. at 1105-07.
102. Id at 1107-08.
103. Id at 1107; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West, Westlaw through
2012 Reg. Sess.).
104. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1107-08.
105. Id at 1110; CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.).
106. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1105.
107. Id. at 1112.
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that circuit's adoption of the Ninth Circuit stance. os Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v.
Commissioner of Social Security involved a Florida couple, Robert and Karen
Capato, whose marriage came to a sudden end when Robert lost his battle to
cancer.109 After in vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins, whose claims
for survivors benefits were initially denied by a district court for failure to
meet the Act's "child" requirement as determined by Florida intestacy law
under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)."i0
Upon review, the Third Circuit mirrored the Ninth Circuit's analysis by
concluding that because the Capato twins satisfied 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)'s broad
"child" definition, there was no family status matter to determine and thus
section 416(h) need not even be addressed."' Furthermore, Florida inheri-
tance laws were irrelevant because "all parties agree[d] that the applicants
here [were] the [undisputed] biological offspring of the Capatos."ll2 The
court then vacated the order of the district court and remanded the case to
determine whether the twins were "dependent" upon Robert at the time of his
death.i"'
Four months later in April 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit ruled on the exact same issue when deciding Schafer v.
Astrue, a case from Virginia, but with very different results. Unable to even
enjoy a year of marriage to Janice Schafer, Don Schafer was cancer-stricken
and passed away after a heart attack.1 4 Six years later, Janice underwent in
vitro fertilization and gave birth to W.M.S., whose child survivors benefits
were denied on the grounds that W.M.S. would not have been permitted to
inherit from his late father via Virginia intestacy statutes." 5
The circuit court treated the SSA's "reasonable" interpretation of the
Act with Chevron deferencell6 and sought to maintain the agency's "long-
held position" of "requiring all natural children to pass through section 416(h)
to claim child status."ll 7 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that undisputed bio-
logical parentage was not enough to convey natural child standing because
then "it would attribute inconsistent views about child status to . . . Con-
gress." Nor would state inheritance law have been applicable to W.M.S.,
as Virginia intestacy law does not recognize "any child born more than ten
108. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3rd Cir.
2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2012 (2012).
109. Id. at 627.
110. Id. at 627-28.
111. Id. at 630.
112. Id. at 631.
113. Id. at 632.
114. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2680 (2012).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 54; see also supra note 23.
117. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54, 58, 62.
118. Id. at 55.
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months after the death of a parent as that parent's child."ll 9 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's deference to the SSA's interpretation of the Act and subsequent denial
of W.M.S.' child survivors benefits established its stance as far more strin-
gent than that of the Ninth and Third Circuits'.
A year later, however, the issue of Social Security benefits for posthu-
mously conceived children reached the Supreme Court of the United States,
which reversed the Third Circuit's judgment Capato ex rel. B.N.C v. Com-
missioner of Social Security.120  Instead, the Court held that per section
416(h), state intestacy law "is a gateway through which all applicants for
insurance benefits as a 'child' must pass."l21 Siding with the SSA, the Court
found that "reference to state law to determine an applicant's status as a
'child' [was] anything but anomalous."l22 In fact, the Court stated, requiring
child applicants to pass through state intestacy law was a "simple test, one
that ensured benefits for persons plainly within the legislators' contemplation,
while avoiding congressional entanglement in the traditional state-law realm
of family relations."' 23
The Court also addressed the "conspicuous flaws" in the lower court's
reasoning.124 In particular, they examined subsection 416(e)'s "tautological
definition" of a "child" and found, in contrast to the lower court's reliance the
Capato twins as the undisputed biological offspring of Karen and Robert, no
proof that Congress meant for "'biological' parentage to be [a] prerequisite to
'child' status."' 25
Because the "SSA's reading [was] better attuned to" the text and pur-
pose of subsection 416(h),126 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, thus
clearly establishing precedent that child benefit applications must be resolved
by "reference to state intestacy law."' 27
D. Missouri Intestacy Law
Missouri courts have yet to define the inheritance rights of posthu-
mously conceived children, although potentially relevant statutes exist.128
According to section 474.010 of Missouri's general intestate succession stat-
ute, after the decedent's death, his property (or the remainder after distribu-
119. Id. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
121. Id. at 2029 (citing Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012)).
122. Id. at 2031.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2029.
125. Id. at 2029-30; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
126. Id at 2026.
127. Id at 2034.
128. Naguit, supra note 68, at 900.
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tion to the surviving spouse), shall be distributed "to the decedent's children,
or their descendants, in equal parts."1 29
Missouri Revised Statutes section 474.060 concerns the establishment of
parentage. An individual "born out of wedlock" is indisputably the mother's
offspring and may also be "a child of the father" if an "adjudication" prior to
his death or "clear and convincing proof' establishes paternity.130 Although
inheritance is not mentioned, this statute could perhaps be interpreted to allow
a posthumously conceived child to take if definitive evidence of paternity is
provided.13 1
The closest Missouri law comes to addressing the instant issue is illus-
trated in Missouri Revised Statutes section 474.050.132 This provision briefly
touches upon the subject of posthumous heirs (children who were conceived
prior to but born after death, unlike posthumously conceived children who are
both conceived and bom after death) and describes how they may inherit "in
like manner, as if bom in the lifetime of the intestate."l 33 However, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has interpreted this statute only in situations involv-
ing omitted heirs to a trust, in which it has been found exclusive to children
conceived prior to the decedent's death but bom thereafter.134 Consequently,
posthumously conceived children are left unaccounted for.
Thus, it was only a matter of time before the Eighth Circuit expressed its
view on the rights of posthumously conceived children. The appeal of Beeler
v. Astrue to the instant court provided such opportunity and ultimately led to
the Eighth Circuit's adoption of the reasoning from the Fourth Circuit.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
For the very first time, the Eighth Circuit addressed the right of posthu-
mously conceived children to receive SSA child survivors benefits in Beeler
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.010(2)(a) (2000).
130. Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.060(l)-(2).
131. Naguit, supra note 68, at 900.
132. The statute states:
All posthumous children, or descendants, of the
intestate shall inherit in like manner, as if born
in the lifetime of the intestate; but no right of
inheritance accrues to any person other than the
children or descendants of the intestate, unless
they are born and capable in law to take as heirs
at the time of the intestate's death.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.050.
133. Id.
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v. Astrue. In reaching a decision, the instant opinion considered other circuit
court rulings and Iowa intestacy law. 35
The court first addressed Patti Beeler's contention that her daughter
B.E.B.'s natural child status could be determined by methods beyond the
scope of section 416(h), such as by an "undisputed biological relationship." 3 6
The Eighth Circuit quickly rejected that argument, emphasizing that the SSA
clearly interprets section 416(h) to be the "exclusive means" by which natural
child status under section 416(e) could be achieved, as required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d)." Furthermore, because the federal agency could not have possibly
"intended to include a posthumously conceived child" within its originally
drafted definition of a natural child, the SSA's above interpretation of rele-
vant statutory provisions demanded Chevron deference. 138
Next, the court examined similar cases decided in the Third, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits.'39 In response to the Third and Ninth Circuits' disregard of
section 416(h), the Eighth Circuit stated that the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
the Gillett-Netting case "[misread] the legislative history."1 40 Even prior to
the 1939 Amendments, section 209(k),141 the predecessor to current section
402(d), ordered state intestacy law to be the sole means for determining child
applicant status, thus supporting the Eighth Circuit's proposition that state
inheritance requirements had "been a part of the . .. Act all along."1 42
To determine whether B.E.B. qualified as a natural child under section
416(h), the court turned to the Iowa intestacy law in effect at the time of the
final SSA decision.143 The relevant statute stated:
Heirs of an intestate, begotten before the intestate's death but born
thereafter, shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of
135. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2679 (2012). The instant opinion was written by Judge Colloton. Id. at 956.
136. Id. at 960.
137. Id. at 960-61.
138. Id. at 961-62; see also supra note 23.
139. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964.
140. Id.
141. Per section 209(k), the "term 'child' . . . means the child of an individual, and
the stepchild of an individual ... and a child legally adopted by an individual." Id.
142. Id
143. Id. at 964-65. On March 31, 2011, while the Eighth Circuit was considering
this appeal, Iowa legislature passed IOWA CODE § 633.220A, which provides intestate
succession rights to posthumously conceived children "under certain circumstances."
Id. at 966 n.4; see also IOWA CODE § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.). However, section 633.220A does not apply to the instant case because federal
regulations instruct the SSA to consider any versions of state law up until the
agency's final decision; the. SSA's Appeals Council made its final decision on De-
cember 22, 2008. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 n.4. Thus, the new Iowa statute "does not
indicate that it is retroactive to the time of Bruce Beeler's death. " Id.
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the intestate and had survived the intestate. With this exception,
the intestate succession shall be determined by the relationships
existing at the time of the death of the intestate.144
Applying the state code to the instant case, the Eighth Circuit held that
because B.E.B. was not "begotten," or conceived before Bruce Beeler's
death, any possibility of her having an "existing relationship" with Bruce
before his passing was precluded; thus, B.E.B. was denied inheritance rights
under Iowa law.145
Additionally, the circuit court held that an alternate Iowa state code,"'6
providing inheritance rights for illegitimate, biological children who were
"recognized" by their father as his children, was inapplicable to the instant
case.147 Because B.E.B. had not even been conceived at the time of Bruce's
death, it was impossible for Bruce to have "recognized" her as his off-
spring.148 The court stated, "[i]t would stretch the statutory language too far
to say that a child not yet in existence can be recognized by a man as his
child."l 49
The instant court also supported the SSA conclusion that Bruce's ex-
pressed desire for Patti to have his children, as well as his signature on the
hospital form, was insufficient to satisfy section 416(h).so As the Eighth
Circuit noted, Bruce's signature did not directly acknowledge paternity of any
particular child, as was required; thus, B.E.B. failed on all grounds to estab-
lish her natural child status.'
In the instant case, the court held that a posthumously conceived child's
eligibility for survivor benefits is ultimately dependent upon state intestacy
laws.152 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that because Iowa law obvi-
ously barred Patti's daughter from inheriting from Bruce, the prior judgment
144. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965 (emphasis added) (quoting IOWA CODE § 633.220).
145. Id
146. IOWA CODE § 633.222 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). Specifi-
cally:
Unless the child has been adopted, a biological child inherits from the
child's biological father if the evidence proving paternity is available dur-
ing the father's lifetime, or if the child has been recognized by the father
as his child; but the recognition must have been general and notorious, or
in writing. Under such circumstances, if the recognition has been mutual,
and the child has not been adopted, the father may inherit from his bio-
logical child.
Id
147. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965.
148. Id
149. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Id. at 966.
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of the district court awarding Social Security benefits to B.E.B. must be re-
versed and remanded in favor of the SSA.153
V. COMMENT
In Beeler v. Astrue, the Eighth Circuit aligned with the Fourth Circuit to
require posthumously conceived children to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) in
order to achieve child status and be eligible for survivors benefits.154 This
section first applies the instant decision to the state of Missouri and then
broadens the discussion to address the developing circuit court split. Addi-
tionally, the reasoning behind the instant court's decision is evaluated, as well
as its impact upon public policy.
A. Application to Posthumously Conceived Children in Missouri
In applying the instant decision to Missouri, child eligibility for Social
Security benefits becomes synonymous with determining a child's right to
inherit under state intestacy laws. This subgroup of children conceived and
born after the death of one parent has not been exclusively provided for under
Missouri law and therefore is presumed barred from inheriting. 55 Because
they are unable to receive benefits via state inheritance statutes, such posthu-
mously conceived children in Missouri will also be precluded from claiming
Social Security benefits due to the Eighth Circuit's reliance upon section
416(h).15 6
However, a credible argument may be made against the instant pre-
sumption. A person advocating for a posthumously conceived child to obtain
benefits could argue that Missouri Revised Statutes section 474.010 should
permit such a child to inherit because the intestate property is given to the
"decedent's children."157 In light of such a broad designation and absent any
specification that the "children" must be alive during the decedent's lifetime,
as long as the posthumously conceived child is found to be the deceased's
genetic child, he or she should be able to inherit and thus be eligible for sur-
vivors benefits.
It has been suggested that whether a Missouri court would embrace such
an interpretation depends upon the court's focus - either towards "the legisla-
ture's intent [and] the public policy of efficient distribution, or [to] the rights
of posthumously conceived children."'5 However, in spite of this valid ar-
gument and its ideal result, it is most likely too much of a stretch of the stat-
153. Id. at 965-66.
154. Id.
155. See Naguit, supra note 68, at 901; see also supra Part III.D.
156. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960-61.
157. Naguit, supra note 68, at 904; see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
158. Naguit, supra note 68, at 904.
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ute's plain meaning to incorporate posthumously conceived children when
they are clearly absent from any statutory language. 159 In a way, the instant
court's strict adherence to the SSA and its interpretation adds insult to injury
- not only will a posthumously conceived child grow up without his or her
biological father, but he or she will also be unable to accept the financial se-
curity benefits a father would have wanted the child to have in his absence.
B. Recognition and Evaluation of the Circuit Split
The decision of the Eighth Circuit in the instant decision only further
splinters the divide among the circuits and their respective views towards
posthumously conceived children. 160 The Third and Ninth Circuits' rulings
reflect a more merciful standard, which seems to value parental intent over
the SSA's adherence to strict interpretation. Requiring only reliance upon the
deceased parent and an undisputed genetic relationship, these two appellate
courts seem to respect the unfortunate familial situation, recognizing that a
deceased male partner would still want to be "Dad" and be able to provide for
a child even after his death. The Third and Ninth Circuits assume, perhaps
somewhat ideally, that had the parent survived, he would have whole-
heartedly taken full responsibility to care and provide for the child.161
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits essentially went one significant step fur-
ther in relying upon the additional extremity of state intestacy.162 While this
raises the standard for child eligibility, it also discourages uniformity among
the individual states, as each state has its own intestacy laws. Thus, the po-
tential arises for different results within the same circuit.163
This circuit split may encourage a somewhat morbid form of forum
shopping.'6 The state in which the decedent is domiciled at death determines
the applicable state intestacy law.' Thus, if a couple discovers early enough
that the husband will not survive to see his wife become pregnant, the couple
may relocate to a more lenient circuit and select a state with intestate statutes
that favor distribution to posthumously conceived children.
159. Id.
160. See Messmer, supra note 32, at 204; see also supra Part II.C.
161. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3rd
Cir. 2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2012 (2012); Vemoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1109
(9th Cir. 2009); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
162. See supra Part III.C.
163. See supra Part III.C. Compare Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th
Cir. 2004) (applying Arizona law and finding posthumously conceived children could
take SSA benefits), with Vemoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying
California law and finding that posthumously conceived children were not entitled to
SSA benefits).
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C. Internal Logic of the Instant Decision and Suggestions
Examining the logic of the instant opinion, the Eighth Circuit deferred
heavily to the SSA's interpretation and Congress's intent.166 While there is
merit in conceding to established authorities, it is unlikely that while drafting
the 1939 Amendments, the SSA or Congress even considered the possibility
that in the future, a woman could conceive and give birth to children after a
male partner's death.167 Yet, assisted reproduction is quickly advancing, and
like the court in Woodward,168 Congress and the SSA should re-examine their
former interpretations in light of such scientific strides.169 Instead of relying
on state intestate statutes, the Eighth Circuit should have performed its own
interpretation of the requirements for child eligibility. Chevron deference
should not be such a reflexive default, and if more circuits continue to defer
in spite of the changing times, the SSA will continue to be rattled by claims
from posthumously conceived children.170
In the instant decision, the Eighth Circuit held that allowing the Beeler
child to receive child survivors benefits would not further the Social Security
Act's basic purpose of providing for children "'who lost support after the
unanticipated death of a parent."' However, the instant court's reasoning
seems somewhat flawed. Although the death of a parent may be anticipated,
granting Social Security benefits would.still further SSA purposes by provid-
ing financial support to children.172 Perhaps the focus should instead shift to
examine whether posthumously conceived children are really any different
from their traditionally conceived peers in single parent households - when it
comes down to the very basic purpose of providing for children, the two
groups are indistinguishable. A child is no less in need of or less deserving of
the support that an additional parent would have provided simply because that
child's parent passed away before he or she was born.
166. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960-62 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2679 (2012).
167. Id. at 966.
168. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264-66 (Mass.
2002).
169. See Ann-Patton Nelson, Note, A New Era of Dead-Beat Dads: Determining
Social Security Survivor Benefits for Children who are Posthumously Conceived, 56
MERCER L. REV. 759, 774 (2005).
170. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 29, at 277.
171. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 (quoting Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012)). B.E.B. was not alive in 2001 (or earlier)
to anticipate Bruce Beeler's death, nor did she lose any support because she did not
receive any to begin with (she did not exist during Bruce's lifetime to be a viable
recipient). Id. at 965-66.
172. See Capato ex rel B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir.
2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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The Eighth Circuit should have expressed the need for a uniform policy
approach for posthumously conceived children and their rights while also
balancing the states' interest of an "orderly administration of estates," as did
the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 173 Hopefully the recent Supreme Court of
the United States decision in Astrue v. Capatol74 resolved this question and
will begin to make "future cases more consistently decided across the coun-
try."I75 This would further validate and recognize the realities of ART.
Until then, perhaps the most logical and practical solution would be for
each state to create specific guidelines for posthumously conceived children,
instead of relying upon and drawing hazy inferences from traditional state
intestacy statutes enacted by legislatures that likely did not contemplate or
foresee the intersection of these laws and posthumously conceived chil-
dren. 1 In a sense, the instant case prompted Iowa to do just that in its adop-
tion of Iowa Code Annotated section 633.220A.In This statute provides ex-
clusively for posthumously conceived offspring under Iowa intestate succes-
sion:
For the purposes of rules relating to intestate succession, a child of
an intestate conceived and born after the intestate's death or born as
the result of the implantation of an embryo after the death of the in-
testate is deemed a child of the intestate as if the child had been
born during the lifetime of the intestate and had survived the intes-
tate, if all of the following conditions are met:
a. A genetic parent-child relationship between the child and the in-
testate is established.
b. The intestate, in a signed writing, authorized the intestate's sur-
viving spouse to use the deceased parent's genetic material to initi-
ate the posthumous procedure that resulted in the child's birth.
c. The child is bom within two years of the death of the intestate.178
While far from perfect, this state guideline is one step closer to recog-
nizing the rights of posthumously conceived children for Social Security sur-
vivors benefits, just like their traditionally conceived peers. Creating specific
guidelines for posthumously conceived children would not only eliminate
state confusion in trying to apply traditional, centuries-old state intestacy law
173. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265.
174. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
175. See Karlin, supra note 61, at 1352.
176. See id.; see also Nelson, supra note 170, at 773.
177. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 966 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2679 (2012).
178. IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
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to non-traditional children, but it would also prevent discrimination against
children based solely on their conception and birth. 79
D. Public Policy Results and Ramifications
The effects of the Eighth Circuit's decision upon future law and policy
are likely to be widespread. For example, if individual states decide to create
specific guidelines for posthumously conceived children and intestate succes-
sion, their respective policies will likely reflect the dominant perceptions of
their legislatures.'so Additionally, states may refer to the relevant uniform
laws for guidance in forming such statutes.181
Of the previously described uniform codes, one of the most broad and
sensible is U.P.C. § 2-120.182 Predominant in this particular provision is the
issue of consent, which, with the exception of consent in writing, has yet to
be wholly defined. Could proof that a couple talked about having children
before one partner's untimely death be enough to qualify as consent?'83 And
who would be allowed to offer such proof? The couple's lack of contracep-
tion (or use thereof) may also be indicative of the decedent's consent (or ob-
jection) to postmortem conception.184 Such consent analysis is further com-
plicated by the potential that proponents of the evidence, via a substituted
judgment standard, could have a conflict of interest. For example, if a
decedent's mother were to attempt to offer proof that her deceased son
wanted to be a father, she could be motivated by the desire to have grandchil-
dren or to potentially inherit a portion of a large estate.' 86
There is also a possibility that children could be posthumously con-
ceived even after the deaths of both genetic material providers. Although a
third party's request to use the cryopreserved gametes is unlikely and would
be highly scrutinized, the situation still calls for "ascertaining the consent of
two persons rather than one."' 87  Ultimately, in order to determine the
boundaries of a decedent's consent, the evidence regarding his or her repro-
179. See Naguit, supra note 68, at 907.
180. See Karlin, supra note 61, at 1341.
181. See supra Part III.B.
182. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
183. According to the U.P.C. § 2-120 2008 amendments, a married couple need
not even have talked about having a child in order to satisfy the consent issue. As
long as the deceased spouse was married to the birth mother, no divorce proceeding
was pending, and no evidence indicates to the contrary, then the deceased individual
is presumed to have consented to parentage. There is no need to further investigate
for the deceased's specific consent. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008),
cmt. subsec. (f), 8 U.L.A. 59 (Supp. 2011).
184. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 257.
185. Id.
18 6. Id.
187. Id. at 256.
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ductive rights, as well as those of the surviving spouse and the inheritance
rights of pre-existing family members, are likely to take center stage.
Showcasin further support of U.P.C. § 2-120, Iowa recently adopted a
similar statute,' 9 which mirrors the U.P.C. requirements a posthumously
conceived child must meet in order to be deemed a child of the intestate (and
therefore be eligible for SSA survivors benefits). Modeled after the "in
utero" provision of section 2-120, one requirement of the Iowa statute is
that the child be born within two years after the intestate's death.' 9 1
These parameters for when an unborn child may be brought into the
world attempt to balance two interests - that of a timely settlement of the
estate and the "humane interest" of providing time to the surviving partner to
grieve before even considering ART.192 With respect to the latter interest, if
states are to adopt such timeframes, they should consider the financial and
emotional burdens of ART.193 No matter the method, the surgical procedure
is likely to be costly, and such expense would fall upon the recent widow,
perhaps still struggling with hospital or funeral bills or even searching for a
new job to support a future child. Additionally, ART is not always successful
the first time, and if the widow is to carry to full term, setting a two-year limit
would basically require the female to be impregnated within the first year
after her husband's death. Nurturing and raising a child as a single parent
requires a significant amount of mental and emotional stability, and it is un-
fair to put a limit upon how quickly a surviving spouse must recover to make
such a significant life choice and give birth.
However, the argument could be made that, with respect to administer-
ing the estate in a timely fashion, such a time limitation is "both fair and con-
stitutional" as it recognizes the right of already existing heirs to "receive their
distributions in a reasonably prompt time."194 Since an estate executor or
personal representative should not be expected to keep the estate open for an
indefinite period, the time restriction ensures an efficient settlement of the
estate; without it, shares could be distributed to already-existing heirs, only
later to be collected and re-distributed to include for after-born, posthumously
conceived heirs. Perhaps the time limit should be modified to include a no-
tice provision, in which the surviving partner alerts the estate administrator of
her intent to conceive posthumously.195 Thus, if no notice is given, the ad-
188. Id. at 253.
189. IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
190. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008), cmt. subsec. (f), 8 U.L.A. 59
(Supp. 2011).
191. IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1).
192. Kurtz & Waggoner, supra note 70, at 36.
193. See Nelson, supra note 169, at 775.
194. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 29, at 275-76.
195. Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code's Surprising Gender
Inequities, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 335, 351 (2011).
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ministrator is free to proceed "without worrying about the effect of a [post-
humously conceived] child."'
One benefit of the Eighth Circuit's otherwise unforgiving stance is that
it will likely deter fraudulent acts. Although somewhat difficult to imagine, if
widows were financially motivated to bear more children in order to collect
greater survivors benefits, they would be sorely disappointed by the Eighth
Circuit's decision.197 Adhering to state intestacy statutes as they stand, the
Eighth Circuit attempts to maintain a systematic administration of estates
within each state. With the exception of Iowa, there is simply one set of in-
testate statutes for each state to reference, whether dealing with a traditionally
or posthumously conceived child.
With regard to the future, the current unfavorable treatment in select ju-
risdictions of posthumously conceived children may discourage the use of
assisted reproduction. An already significant and often criticized decision,
widows and same sex couples (who face even greater legal hurdles) will not
only have to consider whether ART is appropriate for them, but also how, if
something were to happen, a potential child would be cared for without the
receipt of child survivors benefits. Such obstacles may very well lead to the
decline of reproductive technology, as potential parents (and therefore ART
clients) of all types are turned away from the idea before even trying. If the
current rate of assisted reproduction stalls, attention on the community will
wane, leading to the dwindling of financial and intellectual support, as well as
precluding further advancements in the field.
While much in the sphere of rights for children conceived and born after
an individual's death remains uncertain, the Eighth Circuit's decision in the
instant decision makes one thing clear: in spite of any amount of intent from a
deceased parent to support an unborn child, a posthumously conceived child
in the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction will be at the mercy of state intestacy
codes to determine his or her eligibility for Social Security survivors benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Beeler v. Astrue solidified its stance in
the emerging circuit split. In framing posthumously conceived child eligibil-
ity for Social Security survivors benefits as synonymous with the ability to
inherit under state intestacy, the Eighth Circuit sided with the Fourth Circuit,
as opposed to the Third and Ninth Circuits, which require only an undisputed,
dependent parent-child relationship. While the Supreme Court of the United
States' decision on the issue in an upcoming case will likely determine the
fate of this issue, each state would be wise to adopt a provision to its intestacy
laws that specifically addresses the rights of children conceived and born
after the death of a parent. Doing so would not only clarify and standardize
196. Id.
197. See Karlin, supra note 61, at 1341.
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the means for such children's Social Security benefits eligibility, but it would
also ensure equal treatment for posthumously conceived children alongside
their traditionally conceived peers.
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